Global Trading Strategien Nj

Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) bieten Beratung und Dienstleistungen im Zusammenhang mit Handels - und Anlagestrategien unter Verwendung von Futures-Kontrakten und Optionen auf Futures-Kontrakte auf einer Vielzahl von physischen Gütern wie Agrarerzeugnissen, Forstprodukten, Metallen und Energie sowie derivative Kontrakte auf Finanzinstrumente Wie Indizes, Anleihen und Währungen. Jeder CTA zeichnet sich durch seine jeweilige Handelsstrategie und die von ihm gehandelten Märkte aus. CTAs werden durch die US-Bundesregierung durch Registrierung bei der Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) und Mitgliedschaft in der National Futures Association (NFA) geregelt. Die CTA-Performance-Informationen, die auf ctaperformance präsentiert wurden, wurden von Equinox Fund Management, LLC, basierend auf Informationen erstellt, die von jedem jeweiligen Manager von Rohstoff-Futures und Devisenhandelsprogrammen, die von Equinox Fund Management und seinen Tochtergesellschaften verfolgt werden, bereitgestellt werden. Die CTA-Leistungsinformationen enthalten keine Stellungnahme oder Analyse der Equinox Fund Management oder eines ihrer verbundenen Unternehmen, und die Vollständigkeit und Genauigkeit der Performance-Informationen, die an Equinox Fund Management gemeldet wurden, kann in keinem Fall unabhängig überprüft werden. Bitte beachten Sie, dass die CTA-Performance möglicherweise nicht die tatsächliche Fondsleistung widerspiegelt. Auswählen eines Managers Beach Horizon LLP Horizon Programm (Composite) BH-DG Systematischer Handel LLP Systematisches Trading-Programm Campbell Company Managed Futures Portfolio Chesapeake Capital Corporation Diverses Programm Crabel Capital Management, LLC Multi-Produkt-Programm Doherty Advisors, LLC Relative Value - Moderate Emil van Essen , LLC Multi-Strategie-Programm Emil van Essen, LLC Spread Trading-Programm FORT, LP Global Contrarian Programm FORT, LP Global Diversified Programm H2O Asset Management Force 10 JE Moody Company, LLC Commodity Relative Value Programm KeyQuant SAS Key Trends Programm Quantica Capital AG Managed Futures-Programm Quantitative Investment Management Globales Programm QuantMetrics Capital Management, LLP Quantmetrics Multi Strategy Fund Quest Partner, LLC Tracker Index Programm Red Oak Commodity Advisors, Inc. Grundlegendes Handelsprogramm Rosetta Capital Management, LLC Rosetta Handelsprogramm Transtrend BV Diversifiziertes Trendprogramm - Erweitertes Risiko (USD) Winton Capital Management, Ltd. Futures-Programm Wertpapiere, die durch Equinox Group Distributors, LLC, Mitglied FINRA angeboten werden. 47 Hulfish Street, Suite 510, Princeton, NJ 08542 1.877.837.0600 Es gibt erhebliche Risiken und potenzielle Interessenkonflikte, die mit Managed Futures Programmen verbunden sind. Der Erfolg einer Investition in ein solches Programm hängt von der Fähigkeit eines Rohstoffhandelsberaters (CTA) ab, rentable Investitionsmöglichkeiten zu identifizieren und erfolgreich zu handeln. Die Identifizierung von attraktiven Handelschancen ist schwierig, erfordert Geschick und erfordert eine erhebliche Unsicherheit. Der hohe Grad der Hebelwirkung, die oft im Futures-Handel erhältlich ist, kann sowohl gegen Sie als auch für Sie arbeiten und kann zu großen Verlusten führen. Rücksendungen, die aus einem CTA-Handel generiert werden, können, falls vorhanden, Sie nicht angemessen für die geschäftlichen und finanziellen Risiken, die Sie übernehmen, entschädigen. Sie können alle oder einen erheblichen Betrag Ihrer Investition verlieren. Managed Futures Konten können erhebliche Gebühren für Management-und Beratungskosten unterliegen. Es kann notwendig sein, dass Konten, die diesen Gebühren unterliegen, erhebliche Handelsgewinne erzielen, um eine Erschöpfung oder Erschöpfung ihres Vermögens zu vermeiden. CTAs können hoch illiquide Märkte oder auf ausländischen Märkten handeln und können nicht in der Lage sein, Positionen sofort auf Anfrage zu schließen oder zu versetzen. Sie haben möglicherweise Markt-Exposition, auch nachdem die CTA hat einen Antrag auf Schließung oder Liquidation. VERGANGENE LEISTUNG IST NICHT NOTWENDIGE INDIKATIVE DER ZUKÜNFTIGEN ERGEBNISSE. ES IST RISIKO VON VERLUST SIE KÖNNEN GELD IN EINEM MANAGED FUTURES PROGRAMM VERLIEREN. Copyright 2017, Equinox Fund Management. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Proprietary Trading Firms Listing von proprietären Handelsfirmen Akuna Capital Akuna Capital ist ein schnell wachsendes Boutique-Handelshaus, das sich auf derivative Marktmacherei und Arbitrage spezialisiert hat. (Chicago) Aldersgate Trading Aldersgate Trading Ltd ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen spezialisiert auf die Erleichterung, Entwicklung und Verwaltung von Finanzderivaten Händler. (London) Allston Trading Allston Trading, LLC, ist ein führender Marktmacher in den weltweiten Finanzbörsen. Wir handeln Hunderte von verschiedenen Aktien, Anleihen, Futures, Optionen und andere Finanzinstrumente in über 30 Börsen. (Chicago) Altrion Trading Group Altrion Trading wurde von professionellen Händlern gegründet, um eine ernsthafte Leere auf dem Markt zu füllen, indem sie aufstrebende Händler die Ausbildung und Mentorität, die sie benötigen, um erfolgreich zu sein, sowie die Technologie, niedrige Gebühren und Kapital zu halten Profis an der Top ihres Spiels. (San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York) Amplify Trading Amplify Trading ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen spezialisiert auf die Entwicklung neuer Trading-Talent bietet direkte Erfahrung auf den Finanzmärkten. (London, Madrid, Paris, Frankfurt, Brisbane) Archelon Group Archelon LLC ist ein Optionsmarktmacher und proprietärer Händler von börsennotierten Optionen, Futures und Aktien in den USA, Europa und Korea. (Chicago, Frankfurt) Assent Assent ist ein nationales Aktienhandelsunternehmen, das derzeit Hunderte von Händlern im ganzen Land bedient. Avatar Securities Avatar Securities, LLC ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das Handelsdienste für einzelne Händler und große Handelsgruppen anbietet. Avatar ist spezialisiert auf direkten Marktzugang, systematischen und algorithmischen Handel in Aktien und Exchange aufgeführten Optionen mit robusten Handelsböden in Manhattan, Chicago und eine Präsenz bundesweit. (New York, Chicago). (New York, Chicago) Blue Point Trading Blue Point Trading ist ein einzigartiges Boutique-proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das überdurchschnittliche Handelsrenditen für seine Anleger über seinen verwalteten Fonds zur Verfügung stellt. (Toulon, Frankreich) Bluefin Trading Bluefin Holdings, LLC ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Schwerpunkt auf Marktmacherei in börsengehandelten Derivatprodukten. (New York, London, Chicago, Hongkong) Blueprint Capital Blueprint Capital ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf die Entwicklung neuer Trading-Talente und die Erleichterung von erfahrenen Händlern spezialisiert hat. Wir sind ein führender Innovator im elektronischen und algorithmischen Handel. (London) Belvedere Trading Belvedere Trading ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Aktienindexoptionen spezialisiert hat. (Chicago) Blue Capital Group Blue Capital Group ist ein privat gehaltenes Futures - und Optionshandelsunternehmen mit Sitz in Deerfield, Illinois. (Chicago, Chapel Hill) Breakwater Trading Breakwater ist eine agile, fokussierte, proaktive Organisation, die sich bemüht, Technologie mit Intelligenz und Marktvision zu integrieren. (Chicago) Bright Trading Bright Trading, LLC ist ein professionelles, proprietäre Aktienhandel Unternehmen. Wir haben Hunderte von unabhängigen Händlern, die von Dutzenden von Standorten in den Vereinigten Staaten handeln. Darüber hinaus genießen unsere 8220Bright-at-Home8221 Händler die Vorteile von proprietären Handel aus dem Komfort ihrer Häuser. (Las Vegas) Broad Street Trading Broad Street Securities Group (ehemals Broad Street Trading) ist ein Multi-Strategie-proprietären Handelsunternehmen mit state of the art Technologie und Zugang zu festen Kapital. Wir sind ein registrierter Broker-Händler, Mitglied CBSX. (New York) Capital Traders Group Capital Traders Group ist ein proprietäres Day Trading-Unternehmen, das seinen Mitgliedern Zugang zu festen Kapital-, proprietären Trading-Software, Remote-Verstärker vor Ort Schulung und Live-virtuellen Trading-Office für Remote-Mitglieder. Capstone Trades, Aktien, Rohstoffe, Fixed Income und Geldmärkte auf der ganzen Welt. (London, New York, Chicago) Chicago Trading Company Chicago Trading Company (CTC) ist ein proprietäres Marktunternehmen und wird international als führender Anbieter von Preisen und Liquidität an allen US-Derivat-Börsen anerkannt. (Chicago, New York, London) Chicago-WTS Chicago-WTS ist eine proprietäre Handelsgruppe mit Sitz in Chicago, einem Geschäftsbereich der WTS Proprietary Trading Group LLC. WTS ist Mitglied des CBSX und ist SEC registriert. Chopper Trading Angetrieben von Pionier-Technologie und Forschung, Chopper Trading LLC8217s multidisziplinäre Team von Händlern und Analysten schnell zu identifizieren und Kapitalisierung auf neue Möglichkeiten. (Chicago, London, New York, Washington DC) Cube Capital Management Corp. Chicago basierte proprietäre Handelsgesellschaft. Discrete System Proprietary Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz in Quebec, Kanada. Unsere Händler handeln die Firma8217s Kapital an mehreren US-Aktienmärkten: NYSE, NASDAQ und AMEX. DRW Trading Group Die DRW Trading Group ist eine aggressive, engagierte Organisation, die sich in vielen verschiedenen Aspekten der Handelsbranche engagiert, darunter Markt - und Eigenhandel. Büros in Chicago, New York und London. Dubai Professional Trading Group DPTG wurde 2007 als erstes professionelles Trading-Floor im Mittleren Osten gegründet und ist weiterhin führend in der Branche. DV Trading DV Trading ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das an allen großen nordamerikanischen und europäischen Futures-Börsen in einer Vielzahl von Asset-Klassen durchgeführt wird. EchoTrade ECHOtrade ist eine professionelle Handelsfirma, die sich den Bedürfnissen des ernsthaften Offroad-Händlers widmet. Eagle 7 Trading Eagle 7 Trading ist ein in Privatbesitz befindliches, proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich im Chicago Board of Trade in der Innenstadt von Chicago befindet. Eldorado Trading 8211 Eldorado Trading, LLC, ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das auf globalen Rentenmärkten CME Eurodollars, CBOT Treasuries, LIFFE Euriborby ist der führende Innovator der elektronischen Handelswelt. Die Gründer von Eldorado handeln seit der Gründung des Siebhandels in den frühen 1990er Jahren elektronisch und geben dem Unternehmen einen Vorsprung, da die Transaktionen von einem offenen Aufschrei in den Handelsgruben zum elektronischen Handel auf den Bildschirmen migrieren. (Chicago) Epoch Trading Group Epoche ist ein vollautomatisches, systematisches Handelsunternehmen mit 50 Mitarbeitern und wurde 2008 gegründet. Unser Hauptsitz befindet sich in Sydney, Australien. EUROPROP Trading Ein Führer bei der Erleichterung, Schulung und Unterstützung von Händlern auf globalen elektronischen Märkten. Die Firma hat ihren Sitz in Madrid, Spanien und Teil der Alhambra Capital. EUROPROP bietet DMA und niedrige Clearing-Raten für globale Aktien und Futures. Flow Traders Ein führender globaler, technologiefähiger Liquiditätsanbieter, der sich auf Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) spezialisiert hat. Frontline Capital Frontline Capital ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Aktien, Futures-Produkte und Währungen in allen nordamerikanischen und europäischen Börsen spezialisiert hat. (Toronto) Fusionary Trading Fusionary nutzt eine Synthese der Weisheit der Zeitalter und bewährte Werkzeuge, um Ihnen zu helfen, mehr Geld in kürzerer Zeit zu machen. Futex Trading 8211 Futex wurde von Händlern gegründet, die seit 1990 auf dem LIFFE-Gelände auf dem LIFFE-Gelände waren. 1998, als der LIFFE-Boden auf Computerbildschirme migrierte, waren die Futex-Händler einer der ersten, (London, Woking, Singapur, Chicago) Gambit Trading Gambit Trading, LLC ist eine proprietäre Handelsgruppe derzeit in Rolling Meadows, IL. GETCO 8211 GETCO ist ein privat geführtes, elektronisches Handelsunternehmen, das sich der Verbesserung der Liquidität und Effizienz in den weltweiten Finanzmärkten widmet. (Chicago, London, New York, Singapur) Gelber Group 8211 Gelber ist ein einzigartiger Dienstleister für den einzelnen professionellen Händler, professionelle Handelsgruppe oder Institution. Wir haben einen unerschütterlichen Fokus auf Technologiemanagement und Service, da wir versuchen, unseren Zugang zu flüssigen elektronischen Märkten auf der ganzen Welt zu erweitern. Gelber Group unterhält die Philosophie, dass klare Kommunikation und Interaktion erfolgreiche Handelsergebnisse bringen. (Chicago, Cranford NJ, Greenwich CT, San Diego, London, Schindellegi Schweiz) Genesis Securities 8211 Genesis bietet eine vollständig anpassbare, hochmoderne DMA-Plattform Laser für den anspruchsvollen Händler. Genf Trading 8211 Genf Trading ist ein proprietäres elektronisches Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz in Chicago, Illinois USA und Dublin, Irland. Fokus liegt auf elektronisch gehandelten Futures - und Aktienmärkten in den USA und Europa. (Chicago, Dublin) GGT Trading Proprietary Equity Optionen Trading Firm. (Chicago) Die GHF Group GHF Group fördert ihr kräftiges Wachstum durch den Aufbau starker lokaler Beziehungen, die Rekrutierung der hellsten Talente und die Ermittlung und Erfassung von Chancen vor dem Markt. Grace Hall Trading Grace Hall Trading ist eine proprietäre Handelsfirma, die sich auf Transaktionsarbitrage, Volatilitätsarbitrage und ereignisgesteuerten Handel spezialisiert hat. Mit Sitz in Chicago und im Jahr 2008 gegründet, nutzt das Unternehmen modernste Technologie, da es Futures, Aktien und Aktienoptionen handelt. Great Point Capital Great Point Capital ist ein FINRA eingetragenes Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago. Group One Trading 8211 Group One ist eine der größten proprietären Optionen Handelsfirmen des Landes. (New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco) Hard Eight Trading Hard Eight Futures, LLC und Hard Eight Trading, LLC sind proprietäre Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago, Illinois. (Chicago) Heron Futures Heron Futures ist ein führender unabhängiger Handelsfirma, der Händler im Futures-Markt unterstützt. (London) HTG Capital Partners Die HTG-Mission soll den Erfolg ihrer Händler ermöglichen. (Chicago, New York) Hold Brothers 8211 Proprietary Online Stock Trading. IMC Financial Markets 8211 Die IMC Group ist eine globale Finanzorganisation mit Präsenz in Amsterdam, London, New York, Chicago, Hongkong, Sydney und Zug. Infinium Capital Management 8211 Infinium Capital Management ist eine proprietäre Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft mit Niederlassungen in Chicago und New York. Gegründet in Chicago im Jahr 2001 wurde unsere Firma von einem Kernteam mit jahrzehntelanger Erfahrung im Handel, Software-Entwicklung und Finanzmodellierung gebaut. Die Gründer teilen unternehmerische Vergangenheit, nachdem sie eine Vielzahl von Unternehmen und Technologien sowohl in als auch außerhalb der Finanzmärkte gebaut und verkauft haben. Integra Capital Integra Capital ist ein in New York ansässiges Handelsunternehmen und ein Geschäftsbereich der T3 Trading Group. Integra ist die Heimat von hauseigenen und entfernten Händlern im ganzen Land. Sie bieten Kapital Hebel, professionelle Handelsplattformen und außergewöhnliche Concierge-Service-Unterstützung für aktive Aktien, Optionen und Forex Trader. Intelligent Market Trading Company 8211 Die Intelligent Market Trading Company ist ein in Chicago ansässiges, proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit dem Schwerpunkt der Anwendung modernster Technologie und Handelstechniken auf das Problem der Boden gehandelten und elektronisch gehandelten derivativen Wertpapiere. International Trading Group DE Trading Corporation 8211 In Privatbesitz befindliche Handelsgesellschaft in den nördlichen Vororten von Chicago. Jane Street Capital 8211 Jane Street ist eine quantitative proprietäre Handelsfirma, die ein tiefes Verständnis von Märkten, einem wissenschaftlichen Ansatz und innovativen Technologie zusammen bringt, um profitabel an den Finanzmärkten zu handeln. Jane Street doesn8217t suchen externe Investitionen und hat keine Kunden. Gegründet im Jahr 2000, ist Jane Street 190 engagierte Menschen in New York, Chicago, London und Tokio. Jump Trading 8211 Jump Trading, LLC ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Handelsindex-Futures, Optionen und Aktien konzentriert. Weil wir keine Maklerfirma sind, haben wir keine Kunden. Einnahmen kommen ausschließlich aus dem Handel Jump8217s proprietäre Konto. Jump Trading ist Mitglied der Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), der Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), der Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) und der American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Jump ist auch ein Nicht-Clearing-Mitglied der Europäischen Börse (Eurex). (Chicago, London, Singapur) Kershner Trading Group 8211 Seit 1993 ist Kershner Trading auf der Idee des gemeinsamen Erfolges aufgebaut worden. Wir sind ein klassisches proprietäres Handelsgeschäft, das unseren Händlern vollen Service, Support und Kapital zur Verfügung stellt, einschließlich modernster proprietärer Technologieanwendungen mit direktem Zugang zu den US-Märkten. Unsere Händler handeln derzeit in unserem Austin, Tx Büro, aber wir sind immer daran interessiert, von Gruppen von erfolgreichen Händlern an anderen Orten zu hören. Mitglied NASD, SEC registriert. Ketchum Trading Ketchum Trading, LLC ist ein privat geführtes, proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago, Illinois. Kingstree Trading 8211 Chicago Prop Trading-Firma, die zu einem Zeitpunkt angeblich ein Drittel des Volumens in der E-Mini SampP. (Chicago) Lake Street Trading Lake Street Trading (LST) ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago, Illinois. League Traders Limited Unabhängige Unterstützung von London-basierte Finanz-Futures-Händler. Fokussierung auf die wichtigsten Finanz-Futures-Märkte auf LIFFE, EUREX und CME. L. E.S. Trading Traders handeln durch ein CBOE Stock Exchange (CBSX) Mitglied und SEC registrierte Broker-Händler. Equity Trader, Quantitative Trader, Black Boxs, Graukasten-Anwendungen und Remote-Händler sind alle willkommen. London Global Invetsments London Global Investments ltd ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen spezialisiert auf die Ausbildung und Verwaltung von proprietären Händler Handel Hebelprodukte. Mako Group Mako Group ist ein weltweit diversifiziertes Finanzunternehmen mit Vertriebs-, Handels - und Investmentmanagement. Man über den Markt Von Lewis Borsellino geleitet, ist Man Over Market ein neues Programm für junge Profis, die gerne in das Investment-Spiel zu bekommen. Marex Trading 8211 MAREX Financial ist ein unabhängiger Broker-Händler, der weltweite Berichterstattung über Rohstoffe, Finanzterminkontrakte und Optionen und FX-Märkte anbietet. Marquette Partners 8211 Marquette Partners ist ein führender Liquiditätsanbieter für die weltgrößten Derivate-Börsen. Als frühzeitiger Pionier im elektronischen Futures-Handel hat Marquette erfolgreich Einzelpersonen entwickelt, um auf den weltweiten Austausch zu tauschen, darunter die Chicago Mercantile Exchange, die Chicago Board of Trade, Eurex, Euronext-Paris, Euronext-LIFFE und Borsa Italia. (Chicago) Mercury Financial Futures Ein algorithmisches Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz im Herzen der City of London. MET Traders Ein führendes Finanz-Futures-Handelshaus, das sich auf den proprietären Handel spezialisiert hat und den Zugang zu den weltweit8217 führenden Derivat-Börsen einschließlich Euronext. LIFFE, CME, CBOT, Eurex und ICE Futures bietet. (London) MGB Trading MGB Trading ist ein privat geführtes Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz in Montreal, Kanada. Trader bei MGB, Handel der firm8217s Kapital auf dem NASDAQ, NYSE amp AMEX Markt. Nico Trading 8211 Nico Holdings LLC ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen. Wir machen Märkte und nehmen Platz 24 Stunden am Tag. Wir sind in börsengehandelten und außerbörslichen Märkten tätig, darunter Spot - und Derivatkontrakte. Oak Futures Das Hotel liegt in der Finanzhauptstadt Europas Oak Futures City of London Büro ist ideal positioniert, um die harte Arbeit, professionelle und lebendige Umgebung von gleichgesinnten Menschen geschaffen nutzen. (London) Optiver 8211 Optiver ist ein internationales Handelshaus, das sich hauptsächlich in Derivaten, Aktien und Anleihen befasst. Das Unternehmen hat sich von einigen Amsterdamer Marktmachern zu einer globalen Arbitrage-Gruppe mit Tochtergesellschaften in Chicago und Sydney erweitert. Patak Trading Partners Patak Trading Partners ist eine Boutique proprietäre Handelsgruppe mit Sitz in Chicago. Peak6 Trading 8211 Eine der größten Aktienoptionen marktbasierte Firmen in den USA (Chicago, San Francisco, Seattle, New York) Philadelphia Proprietary Trading Group Ein Boutique-Unternehmen gepaart mit den globalen Ressourcen von WTS Proprietary Trading, dem führenden Liquiditätsanbieter am CBSX Positive Equity Limited Positive Equity wurde im Jahr 2008 gegründet und konzentriert sich auf Disziplin, harte Arbeit und Innovation in Strategien und Produkte für den Erfolg. Wir handeln Futures und Aktien. Wir stellen sowohl erfahrene Händler als auch Auszubildende vor, die bereit sind, hart für den langfristigen Erfolg zu arbeiten. Prime International Trading Unsere Händler passen nicht zu einer echten Form. Einige sind sehr groß und viele mehr sind Nischenhändler. Sie konzentrieren sich auf Markt - und Arbitrage-Chancen mit soliden Risiko-Belohnungsauszahlungen. Pulsar Capital Pulsar Capital ist ein internationales proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das weltweit auf einer breiten Palette von Assetklassen (Aktien, Währungen, Zinssätze, Metalle, Energie, Viehbestände, Softs und Landwirtschaft) tätig ist. Reverb Capital 8211 Reverb Capital macht sich aus dem Epizentrum des Chicagos Financial District gehört. Fokussiert auf den Hochfrequenzhandel in den Aktien-, Futures - und Optionsmärkten, ist Reverb ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das auf eine andere Trommel schlägt. Ronin Capital 8211 Eigene Handelsgeschäfte für eine Vielzahl von Märkten, einschließlich Aktien, Staatsanleihen, Unternehmensanleihen und damit zusammenhängende Derivate auf globalen Börsen und elektronisch. Savius, LLC Savius, LLC ist ein Boutique-proprietäre Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago und Händler in den USA und Europa. SKTY Trading 8211 SKTY Trading wurde im Jahr 2002 als marktführendes Unternehmen in EuroDollar-Optionen auf der Chicago Mercantile Exchange gegründet. Seit Anfang hat SKTY seinen Fokus auf mehrere Produkte an mehreren Börsen erweitert. SMB Capital 8211 SMB Capital, LLC ist eine in Privatbesitz befindliche Investmentpartnerschaft, die sich im Tagesgeschäft NYSE und NASDAQ-Aktien engagiert. Die Schneider Group Schneider Group ist ein weltweit führendes Unternehmen, das Händler und Broker weltweit mit der schnellsten Konnektivität, der neuesten Handelstechnologie und der fachmännischen IT - und Risikomanagement-Unterstützung betreut. Die Schonfeld-Gruppe Schonfeld Securities, LLC, hat die kurzfristige Handelsbranche bei der Inbetriebnahme im Jahr 1988 vorangetrieben. Sie ist eine der größten US-amerikanischen Aktienhandelsunternehmen in Bezug auf die Anzahl der Händler und das Volumen, das an der NYSE und der NASDAQ gehandelt wird. SFG Trading Services Ein globales Handelsdienstleistungsunternehmen, das quantitative und automatisierte kundenspezifische Lösungen für erfahrene High-Volume-Händler und professionelle Handelsgruppen rund um den Globus spezialisiert auf U. S, kanadischen und europäischen Aktien und Futures-Märkte. Simplex Investments 8211 Chicago basierte off-floor proprietären Handelsunternehmen konzentrierte sich auf den aktiven Händler. Spot Trading Spot Trading ist ein Off-Floor-Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Aktienoptionen spezialisiert hat. (Chicago) Starmark Prop Trading Starmark ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich dafür einsetzt, den Finanzhändlern den Zugang zu den globalen Märkten zu wettbewerbsfähigen Preisen zu ermöglichen, mit der besten verfügbaren Technologie. Sun Trading Sun Trading ist eine privat gehaltene, proprietäre Firma, die dem algorithmischen Handel verschiedener Assetklassen in den weltweiten Finanzmärkten gewidmet ist. Susquehanna International Group (SIG) Susquehanna International Group ist ein globales quantitatives Handelsunternehmen, das nahezu alle eigenen Handelstechnologien von Grund auf neu gebaut hat. SIGs-Händler konkurrieren an den Finanzmärkten, indem sie ihre quantitativen Fähigkeiten nutzen, um mit dem SIG-Eigenkapital kalkulierte Risiken zu erwerben. Sie haben ein Best-in-Class Trader-Entwicklungsprogramm. Der Firmenerfolg liegt am Schnittpunkt von Handel, Quantitativ und Technik. System 2 Trading System 2 Trading wurde für Händler von Händlern gegründet. Wir wussten, was wir wollten: Low-Cost-Option Handel, proprietäre Technologie und eine entspannte Collaborative Trading Floor. Aber wir konnten es nicht finden. Also haben wir es selbst gebaut. Tibra Capital Ein globales Unternehmen, das sich auf Marktmacherei und Arbitrage spezialisiert hat. (Chicago, London, Amsterdam, Hong Kong, Sydney, Wollongong) Titel Trading 8211 Titel Trading ist in Privatbesitz geschütztes Handelsunternehmen. Titel-Trader handeln das firm8217s Kapital an mehreren US-Aktienmärkten: NYSE, NASDAQ und AMEX. (Ville St-Laurent. QC) TopstepTrader TopstepTrader lädt Sie ein, die Kraft unseres Trading Combine zu erleben. Wir unterstützen finanziell konsequente, profitable und disziplinierte Futures-Händler. Toro Trading Toro Trading LLC ist ein dynamischer Derivat-Markt, der sich auf Aktienoptionen, Futures und ETFs spezialisiert hat. Toro ist Mitglied der Chicago Board Options Exchange, der Philadelphia Stock Exchange, der NYSE Euronext und der New York Biotech Association. (New York) Torus Capital Torus Capital ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Optionen und Futures in einem breiten Spektrum von Börsen und Produkten spezialisiert hat. (Chicago, Greenwich, New York) Tower Hill Trading Tower Hill Trading ist ein führendes proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz in der Innenstadt von Chicago. Wir bieten eine überlegene Arbeitsumgebung, die Möglichkeit, von der besten, state of the art Technologie, extrem wettbewerbsfähige Auszahlungen und Zugang zu erheblichen Handelskapital zu lernen. (Chicago) Trade Vision Capital Trade Vision Capital bietet seinen Kunden die höchste Endeintragssoftware zur Verfügung. Es ist die einzige Software, die die NASD8217s Platin-Zertifizierung erhält. Tradebot Systems Tradebot Systems bietet Liquidität an der Börse. (Kansas City, MO) Traditum Group Traditum ist ein diversifiziertes, proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich auf Marktmachung, Bewertungsarbitrage und fundamental orientierte Handelsstrategien auf einer Vielzahl von nationalen und internationalen Märkten spezialisiert hat. Transmarket Group TransMarket Group LLC ist eine globale Privathandels - und Investmentgesellschaft. Bereitstellung von Risikokapital und Marktzugang für Einzelpersonen zum Zweck des Handels der globalen Finanzmärkte. Die Mitarbeiter handeln alle globalen börsenkotierten Derivate, Aktien, Rohstoffe und ausgewählte Kassamärkte. (London, Madrid, Mumbai, New York, Singapur, Sydney) Trillium Trading Trillium Trading L. L.C. Ist ein führendes proprietäres Handelsunternehmen, das sich in kurzfristigem Aktienhandel und Portfolio Management auszeichnet. (New York, Edison NJ, Princeton NJ, Miami FL) Twitch LLC Twitch LLC ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in der Chicago Board of Trade Gebäude. Vankar Trading 8211 Professionelles Management von Handelssystemen. Divisionen in Nordamerika, Europa und Australien. Vortex Capital Group Die Vortex Capital Group AG (VCG) ist ein proprietäres Handelsunternehmen mit Schwerpunkt auf verschiedenen Handelsstrategien über mehrere Märkte und Assetklassen. (Toronto) WH Trading WH Trading LLC ist ein proprietäres Futures, Optionen und Aktien Handelsunternehmen mit Hauptsitz in Chicago, IL. Die 1994 gegründete WH Trading dient derzeit als primärer Liquiditätsanbieter auf dem Boden der großen Chicago-Futures-Börsen und auch als Exchange-Lead Market Maker für elektronisch gehandelte Produkte in einer Vielzahl von Assetklassen. (Chicago, London) Wasserman Capital Bei Wasserman Capital ist unsere Leidenschaft Handel und Ausbildung andere, wie man handelt. Wasserman Capital verfügt über ein bewährtes Ausbildungsprogramm, das die gleichen historisch bewährten Methoden nutzt, die erfolgreiche Händler seit über 100 Jahren nutzen. Unser Trainingsprogramm bietet die Trading-Expertise und Hands-on Coaching notwendig, um Ihre Leidenschaft für die Finanzmärkte in Ihre Karriere zu machen. (Miami Beach, FL) Wolverine Trading Wolverine hat seinen Hauptsitz in Chicago und hat Niederlassungen in New York, San Francisco, Philadelphia und London. World Trade Securities WTS Proprietary Trading Group LLC, ist ein privat geführtes Handelsunternehmen mit Sitz in NYC, New York und Mitglied der CBSX und ist SEC registriert. (New York) Xerxes Trading Xerxes Trading stellt die Morristown, NJ Office of Hold Brothers Online Investment Services, LLC (Mitglied FINRA-SIPC). Jobbeiträge, Diskussionen und News in unserer LinkedIn-Gruppe anzeigen Abonnieren und Verbinden Abonnieren Sie unseren NewsletterA Perspektive auf regionale und globale Strategien multinationaler Unternehmen Zitieren Sie diesen Artikel als: Rugman, A. Verbeke, A. J Int Bus Stud (2004) 35: 3 Doi: 10.1057palgrave. jibs.8400073 Multinationale Unternehmen (MNEs) sind die Schlüsselakteure der Globalisierung, da sie eine verstärkte wirtschaftliche Verflechtung auf den nationalen Märkten fördern. Der ultimative Test, um zu beurteilen, ob diese MNEs global sind, ist ihre tatsächliche Penetration von Märkten auf der ganzen Welt, vor allem in den breiten Triad-Märkten der NAFTA, der Europäischen Union und Asien. Dennoch zeigen Daten über die Aktivitäten der 500 größten MNEs, dass nur wenige weltweit erfolgreich sind. Für 320 der 380 Firmen, für die geografische Verkaufsdaten vorliegen, liegen durchschnittlich 80,3 des Gesamtumsatzes in ihrer Heimatregion der Triade. Dies bedeutet, dass viele der weltweit größten Unternehmen nicht global sind, sondern regional basiert, in Bezug auf Breite und Tiefe der Marktabdeckung. Die Globalisierung im Hinblick auf eine ausgewogene geografische Verteilung der Verkäufe über die Triade spiegelt somit ein besonderes und eher ungewöhnliches Ergebnis des internationalen Geschäfts (IB) wider. Die regionale Konzentration der Verkäufe hat wichtige Implikationen für verschiedene Bereiche der Mainstream-IB-Forschung sowie für die breitere Management-Debatte über die Gestaltung von optimalen Strategien und Governance-Strukturen für MNEs. Firmenspezifische Vorteile globale Strategie Lokalisierung regionale Strategie Halb-Globalisierung Trias Wertschöpfungskette Einleitung Die Globalisierung im Sinne einer zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen Verflechtung zwischen den Nationen ist ein schlecht verstandenes Phänomen. In dieser Arbeit konzentrieren wir uns auf die Schlüsselakteure im Globalisierungsprozess, nämlich auf die Unternehmen, die diesen Prozess antreiben. Eine relativ kleine Reihe von multinationalen Unternehmen (MNEs) für die meisten Welten Handel und Investitionen. In der Tat machen die größten 500 MNS über 90 der weltweiten Bestände an ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (FDI) und sie selbst führen etwa die Hälfte des Welthandels (Rugman, 2000). Dennoch zeigt dieses Papier, dass die meisten dieser Firmen keine globalen Unternehmen sind, im Sinne einer breiten und tiefen Durchdringung von ausländischen Märkten auf der ganzen Welt. Stattdessen haben die meisten von ihnen die überwiegende Mehrheit ihrer Verkäufe in ihrem Heimatbein der Trias, nämlich in Nordamerika, der Europäischen Union (EU) oder Asien. Diese neue Sicht auf die Globalisierung unterscheidet sich sehr von der konventionellen Mainstream-Perspektive. Die letztgenannte Perspektive konzentriert sich vor allem auf makroökonomische Wachstumsmuster im Handel und in ausländischen Direktinvestitionen und vergleicht diese Daten mit den nationalen BIP-Wachstumsraten, ohne jedoch die gleichwertigen Wachstumsdaten der Mikro-Ebene für die für die Handels - und FDI-Ströme zuständigen MNEs zu analysieren (United Nations , 2002). Die Trias Macht Konzept amerikanischen wirtschaftlichen Hegemonie, charakteristisch für die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg Ära, endete in den frühen 1970er Jahren. Die Schließung des Goldfensters und das Schwimmen des Dollars im Jahr 1971 kann als ein Frühindikator für die neue Weltordnung angesehen werden, wobei die Wirtschaftskraft mehr über die Trias von Nordamerika, der EU und Asien verteilt ist. Die Entwicklung des Weltbestands der ausländischen Direktinvestitionen weist auf den relativen Rückgang der US-amerikanischen Wirtschaftsmacht hin: 1967 vertraten die Vereinigten Staaten nach wie vor die Mehrheit (50,4) des Gesamtbestandes ausländischer Direktinvestitionen bis 1990, dieser Anteil war nur ein Viertel ( 25.4) (Mahnwesen, 2001). Van Den Bulcke (1995) gibt einen aufschlussreichen Bericht über die Entwicklung einer triadischen Weltwirtschaft. Im Jahr 1985 Kenichi Ohmae, in diesem Stadium ein führender McKinsey Berater in Japan, veröffentlicht seine Wahrzeichen Studie Triad Power. Wohl eines der aufschlussreichsten internationalen Managementbücher der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte. Die Triade, in Ohmaes Arbeit, war ein geographischer Raum, der aus den Vereinigten Staaten, der EU und Japan besteht. This geographic space, according to Ohmae, shares a number of commonalities: low macroeconomic growth a similar technological infrastructure the presence of large, both capital - and knowledge-intensive, firms in most industries a relative homogenization of demand (with a convergence of required key product attributes) and protectionist pressures. The triad is home to most innovations in industry, and includes the three largest markets in the world for most new products. A useful indicator of this core triads enduring importance is the concentration of the worlds largest MNEs in the United States, the EU and Japan, as reported in Rugman (2000). In 2000, of the worlds largest 500 MNEs, 430 had their corporate headquarters in these core triad regions. In 1996 it was 443, in 1991 it was 410, and back in 1981 it was 445. The problem faced by many of these MNEs, according to Ohmae, is that they sell engineered commodities . that is, innovative and differentiated products, resulting from high investments in capital-intensive production processes and knowledge development. Unfortunately, these products rapidly lose their monopoly status . In spite of patents and brand names, technology often diffuses more rapidly to rivals than the required distribution capabilities can be built in foreign markets, thereby making it difficult to recoup innovation costs. The dilemma for any company that has developed a new superproduct with large expected demand throughout the triad is thus as follows: setting up an extensive distribution capability for the product ex ante . throughout the triad, may entail high, irreversible, fixed costs, and therefore high risks, if the superproduct somehow does not deliver on its sales expectations. Conversely, if the superproduct is first marketed at home, rival companies in other legs of the triad are expected to rapidly create an equivalent product, capture their home triad region market, and dominate distribution in that market. In this context, Ohmae introduces the concept of global impasse to describe the problems faced by even the largest companies to repeat their home triad base market share performance in the two other triad markets. Only a limited number of firms, such as Coca-Cola and IBM, have, according to Ohmae, succeeded in becoming a triad power . A triad power is defined as a company that has (1) equal penetration and exploitation capabilities, and (2) no blind spots, in each of the triad regions ( Ohmae, 1985: 165 ). In Ohmaes view the deep penetration into each triad market is critical to the recovery of innovation costs. The absence of blind spots is important in order to avoid surprises: that is, unexpected strategic moves by foreign rivals or home country competitors setting up alliances with foreign firms. A triad power is thus an MNE that has been successful in insiderization. The importance of the absence of blind spots was also emphasized by Hamel and Prahalad (1985). who defined a global company as a firm with distribution systems in key foreign markets that permit cross-subsidization, international retaliation, and world-scale volume. These authors focused especially on the importance of strong, worldwide brand positions and distribution channels, and highlighted the limited value to large firms of mere cost advantages through offshore sourcing and rationalized manufacturing. Given the global impasse challenge described above, Ohmae (1985: Chapter 12) suggests the use of consortia and joint ventures to capture the non-home triad markets. In case the MNE wishes to become a triad power on its own, through wholly owned operations, Ohmae prescribes an Anchorage perspective: that is, a corporate center that is mentally located in Anchorage (Alaska), equidistant from the economic and political power bases in the United States, the EU and Japan. This is in line with Perlmutters (1969) prescription of developing a geocentric mentality in MNEs. In practice, such a firm should operate with regional headquarters in each leg of the triad in order to capitalize on commonalities within each region, at a lower cost and with more market knowledge than if corporate headquarters performed those activities. Finally, Ohmae (1985) contains one last important insight, namely that MNEs from each triad region should identify a fourth region . where it should be easy, relative to the rest of the world, to earn an important market share. This fourth region will depend on the industry and firm involved, but for Japan it would typically include Asian markets, for the United States its neighboring trading partners, and for Europe those countries with which much trade or trade potential exists. However, Ohmae (1985) did not actually anticipate the extension of the core triad to the broad triad of today. The broad triad consists of NAFTA, the expanded EU and Asia. In parallel with the introduction of the Canada US Free Trade Agreement in 1989, NAFTA in 1994 and its expansion to the Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005, the EU will further expand to 25 countries in 2004 (and perhaps more in the future). In Asia, in November 2002, China agreed to a free trade agreement with the 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), signaling a wide trade and investment agreement for Asia. In September 2003, India and the ASEAN members agreed to forge a free trade area by 2012, while Japan and ASEAN agreed to begin negotiations on far-reaching trade and investment liberalization by 2005. Such institutional arrangements represent the agglomeration of attractive, proximate foreign markets (from a geographical, cultural, economic, and administrative perspective) into a broad triad region. This will facilitate even deeper intra-regional market penetration. In contrast, little progress has been achieved in recent years in the realm of more global integration among nations through multilateral negotiations, especially at the level of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This situation is not expected to improve in the near future (for a discussion, see Rugman and Verbeke (2003) ). At present, a majority of trade is intra-regional, and conducted in each part of the broad triad of NAFTA, the EU and Asia ( Rugman, 2000 ). The present paper tests whether the worlds largest firms have been capable of implementing Kenichi Ohmaes visionary strategy and becoming (broad) triad powers during the two decades after his path-breaking book. Our work has three caveats. First, our paper presents data on the distribution of sales across the broad triad regions. This should be considered as a starting point for introducing systematically a regional component in international business (IB) research. Individual MNEs may be faced with specific environmental requirementsopportunities, as well as internal company ones that suggest a different regional delineation, consistent with Ghemawats (2001) framework on the distance between countries. In a similar vein, the subnational level (i. e. regions within a single country) may also be important in the IB context, both for manufacturing location decisions and for the targeting of specific subnational areas for sales and distribution. Second, a balanced distribution of sales across the triad, although likely beneficial to an MNEs sustained performance, is not necessarily critical to all MNEs. For example, firms may attempt to establish a dominant position in their home market, and may have little interest in pursuing a balanced, triad-based distribution of sales. Third, different activities in the value chain may be associated with varying levels of globalization. In this paper we focus primarily on sales, simply because these constitute the ultimate reflection of market success, but we also discuss the issue of downstream vs upstream globalization. Empirical evidence of triad power The 500 largest companies in the world accounted for over 14 trillion of total sales (revenues) in fiscal year 2001. The average revenues for a firm in the top 500 were 28 billion, ranging from Wal-Mart at 220 billion to Takenaka at 10 billion. In this study of the intra-regional sales of these 500 firms, a total of 380 were included with available geographic segment data. These 380 firms account for 79.2 of the total revenues of all the 500 firms. The average sales volume of a firm in the set of 380 is 29.2 billion. Across these 380 large firms the average intra-regional sales represent 71.9. A relative sales dominance in a specific regional market, rather than a very wide and evenly distributed spread of sales, reflects five underlying issues critical to the MNEs functioning. First, if most MNEs sales are unevenly distributed across the globe, and usually concentrated in just one geographic market, this means that the firms products are not really equally accessible andor attractive to consumers all around the world, in spite of many MNEs attempting to adapt their products to local demand. Second, the lack of global market success, although based on aggregate company-level data, could be interpreted as a reflection of the limits to the non-location-bound nature of the MNEs knowledge base that is, their firm-specific advantages (FSAs). Firms may have sophisticated and proprietary technological knowledge, brand names, etc. but there may be severe limits to the joint international transferability of this knowledge, and its acceptance by customers across regions. These limits may exist irrespective of whether the knowledge is embodied in final products and then exported, transferred as an intermediate product through licensing, or utilized in foreign affiliates through FDI. It should be recognized that some examples exist of rapid cross-border integration of sales, as exemplified by the success of Airbus aircraft in the United States, Japanese cars in Europe, and a variety of American consumer goods in Japan and China, but the magnitude of this trend, as compared with overall sales volumes, remains small across the 500 largest companies. Third, the observed lack of market performance across regions may also point to a relative inability to access and deploy the required location-bound FSAs, which would lead to benefits of regional and national responsiveness. Fourth, if the MNEs market position is very different in the various regions of the world this indicates the need for very different competitive strategies: a leadership role in one market may require different patterns of decisions and actions than the role of a (perhaps ambitious) junior player in another market. These differential roles should then be reflected in the deployment of specific combinations of non-location-bound and location-bound FSAs in each region. Unfortunately, in spite of much think global, act local rhetoric in both the academic and popular business press, there appears to be little empirical evidence that this approach has permitted host region market penetration levels similar to those obtained in the home region. Fifth, the four elements above have important implications for MNE governance. It might be incorrect to attribute the present relative lack of overseas market success of many firms to an inappropriate governance structure. The presence of multiple environmental circumstances may also be critical here (powerful foreign rivals in other triad regions government shelter of domestic industries buyer preferences for local products cultural and administrative differences as compared to the home region etc.). However, the need for regional strategies does suggest the parallel introduction of a regional component in the MNEs governance structure to deal appropriately with the distinctive characteristics of each leg of the triad, and with the regions outside it, much in line with Ohmaes (1985) prescriptions. This perspective is developed further in the later sections of the paper. This need for distinct regional strategies should be viewed as a complement to the well-known normative models that advocate simple globalization strategies as a set of purposive decisions and actions instrumental to a broad and deep penetration of foreign markets ( Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001 Jeannet, 2000 Yip, 2002 ). Regionalization should be viewed as an expression of semi-globalization ( Ghemawat, 2003 ). Semi-globalization implies that we observe neither extreme geographical fragmentation of the world in national markets nor complete integration. Incomplete integration means that location specificity, in this case regional specificity, matters. Only in the context of incomplete integration is there scope for international MNE strategy that is conceptually distinct from conventional domestic strategy. Empirical evidence and meaning of regional strategies The majority of the worlds largest 500 companies (the Fortune 500 ) are MNEs: that is, they produce andor distribute products andor services across national borders. Yet, very few MNEs have the ability to sell standardized products and services around the world, a type of globalization originally advocated by Levitt (1983). In the mainstream IB literature it is now widely recognized that benefits of integration resulting from global-scale economies can be reaped only if accompanied by strategies of national responsiveness, guided by both external pressures for local adaptation and internal pressures for requisite variation. What is unfortunately often neglected is that, irrespective of MNEs efforts to augment their alleged non-location-bound FSAs with a location-bound component, no balanced geographical dispersion of sales is achieved in most cases. For 365 of the 380 firms included in our study, data were available that permitted a further decomposition of their foreign sales. It should be noted that many of the remaining 135 Fortune 500 companies are actually operating solely in their home region, with no sales elsewhere, and for others there are insufficient data. Of the 365 with data, only nine MNEs are unambiguously global, with at least 20 of their sales in all three regions of the triad, but less than 50 in any one region. This picture of regionalization, rather than globalization, is shown in Table 1 . Classification of the top 500 MNEs The definitions adopted in Table 1 are as follows: Home region oriented . In all, 320 firms have at least 50 of their sales in their home region of the triad. The threshold of 50 was chosen as we assume that a region representing more than 50 of total sales will systematically both shape and constrain most important decisions and actions taken by the MNE. It also implies a concentration of the MNEs downstream FSAs in that region, as explained in the next section. Bi-regional . In all, 25 MNEs are bi-regional, defined as firms with at least 20 of their sales in each of two regions, but less than 50 in any one region. This set includes 25 firms with sales ranging between 20 and 50 in the home region and 20 or over in a second region. The threshold of 20 was chosen because we assume that having two regional markets, each representing at least one fifth of a large firms sales, reflects impressive market success resulting from extensive downstream FSAs in those two markets. Host region oriented . In all, 11 firms have more than 50 of their sales in a triad market other than their home region. Global . Only nine of the MNEs included are global, defined as having sales of 20 or more in each of the three parts of the triad, but less than 50 in any one region of the triad. The 20 figure is less than the one-third required for an equal triad distribution, and so is biased downwards in favor of finding global MNEs. Conceptually, it implies the successful deployment of downstream FSAs in three distinct markets. The North American and European region of the broad triad are of approximate equal size, as measured by GDP. Asia is smaller than either as measured by GDP, but is nearly equal when taking into account purchasing power parity (PPP). Weighing the three legs of the broad triad by GDP, and even correcting for PPP, will not generate a larger number of global firms. Within each of the groups above, the home triad region sales weighted averages are as follows: home region oriented (320 firms): 80.3 A small set of firms are near miss global MNEs, as they approximate the percentages required to be considered global. One subset includes ExxonMobil, Royal DutchShell and Nestl, which are probably global in terms of geographic spread of their sales, but cannot be so classified due to absent data. Several firms, such as Aventis, are bi-regional and probably would be classified as global if the missing data for Asia were available. Four other MNEs, namely McDonalds, Eastman Kodak, Anglo-American, and 3M, just miss the global firm status. For example, McDonalds has only 14.8 of sales in Asia, Eastman Kodak has only 17.2, Anglo American has 17.8, and 3M has 18.9. Some special cases The two MNEs conventionally regarded as global, indeed as primary agents of globalization, are Coca-Cola and McDonalds. Yet, only Coca-Cola is truly a global MNE. Ranking as 129th in the Fortune 500 list, it has over 20 of its sales across all three parts of the triad: 38.4 in North America, 22.4 in Europe, and 24.9 in Asia. Of Coca-Colas sales in Asia, 74 are in Japan, but the company is attempting to increase its market in China. In contrast, McDonalds, ranked as 340th in the Fortune 500 list, is a bi-regional MNE. It has 36.6 of its sales in North America, 37.1 in Europe, but only 13.8 in Asia. Nike is another interesting case. It is not one of the largest 500 firms, as its sales are under 10 billion. It sources 99 of its products offshore, primarily in China (38) and South East Asia (61), and much of its apparel (86) is produced outside the United States. Yet, Nike is a company with the majority of its sales in the Americas (58.2). Indeed, it has 52.1 of sales in its home market of the United States. Nike also competes in Europe with 29 of its sales there, but not much in Asia with only 12.9 of sales there. In terms of employment, of the 22,000 Nike employees, over half are located in the United States (54.7). If we include other countries in the Americas, this number rises to 60.2. Europe, the Middle East and Africa account for another 24.9. Asia and the Pacific account for about 14.9 (or 3000 employees), but this region is also home to about 660,000 employees of independent contract companies that supply Nike products. These independent contractors are not owned by Nike, but are part of its supply network. Nike is only indirectly responsible for the working conditions of the employees working for these independent firms. Yet, owing to the adverse perceived impact on its brand image of sweatshop conditions in these factories, Nike is now assuming some responsibility for the labor conditions in the factories of its independent suppliers. The Nike case indicates the importance of understanding the precise FSAs of an MNE. Nike is not successful because it outsources most of its production in Asia. Instead, it outperforms other competitors because of its business model, in which its brand name is the dominant FSA. This brand name signifies high-quality, stylish, cool sports shoes and sports apparel. All its competitors also outsource in South East Asia significant portions of production. This access to cheap labor represents a country factor condition, not an FSA by itself. In a similar vein, Wal-Mart outperforms other firms owing to its unique business model, not primarily by outsourcing to China. These firms outsourcing strategies reflect internalization arbitrage more specifically the ability to link attractive (but generally available), host country production factors, used at the upstream end of the value chain with upstream FSAs. However, only in the presence of downstream FSAs (especially branding) do such strategies lead to market success, and this is often restricted to the home triad region. The Nike and Wal-Mart cases illustrate the crucial importance of the sales data used in this paper to assess market success. Implications for emerging research themes In this section, some of the implications of the lack of empirical evidence for globalization are considered across the field of IB research. Five research areas of particular relevance are selected. The first two areas deal with the foundations of MNE competitive advantage, namely FSAs and location advantages, respectively. The next three areas are related to MNE strategy, structure and performance. Implications for the relevance of the internalization and internationalization models of international expansion The internalization model of foreign expansion ( Buckley and Casson, 1976 Rugman, 1981 ), and especially its eclectic paradigm version, has been the dominant conceptual model in IB research during the past two decades. It suggests that firms will establish foreign affiliates in the case of strong ownership advantages, location advantages, and internalization advantages ( Dunning, 1981 ). The model assumes that MNEs systematically engage in a costbenefit calculus of all possible entry modes, namely exports, licensing, and FDI (including, more recently, hybrid modes). Here, FDI may be the preferred mode from the outset if government-imposed and natural market imperfections make exports and licensing impossible or comparatively more expensive, and if the firm has already been operating abroad ( Buckley and Casson, 1981 ). In contrast, the internationalization model of the Scandinavian school argues that firms will incrementally build foreign operations, starting with low resource commitments in culturally proximate countries, and then expanding these commitments and geographic scope. Here experiential learning is critical, and path dependencies can be observed in the growth of the MNEs experiential knowledge base, especially as regards knowledge of the markets involved ( Barkema et al. 1996 Johansson and Vahlne, 1977. 1990 ). Little integration has occurred between the two schools, which have largely flourished on their own without much cross-fertilization, and each has a loyal following of researchers. The internalization school focuses at the outset on market imperfections involving businessusage specificity . whereas the internationalization school starts from imperfections arising from location specificity . in the spirit of Ghemawat (2003). The data presented in this paper suggest that the two approaches may actually be closer to each other than usually thought. The relative lack of market success in host triad regions can be interpreted, at least partly, as a reflection of the limited customer value attributed to home triad region FSAs, whether transferred through exports (FSAs embodied in final products), through licensing (FSAs transferred to foreign licensees), or through FDI (FSAs transferred to foreign affiliates, whether subsidiaries or hybrid units). In such cases the internalization question of optimal entry mode choice becomes redundant. In other words, it is only in locations where the MNEs home region FSAs are valued by customers, as compared with relevant rivals, and for which minimum sales volumes can be expected (at least as far as market-seeking FDI is concerned), that conventional internalization theory is fully relevant. In such case of easy market penetration there is no need for a lengthy learning process, in the sense of an incremental accumulation of host region experience, to compensate for the liability of foreignness. The case of easy market penetration is consistent with Vernons (1966) product life cycle (whereby all innovations with global market potential originate in one country), but with the choice of entry mode contingent upon transaction cost considerations. Paradoxically, internationalization theory identifies the locations where MNEs have the luxury of such an extensive, transaction-cost-driven entry mode selection and where they do not, namely in the case of high location-driven learning requirements. The data suggest that extensive choice options occur mainly in the home triad region, for most companies. Future research should therefore explore in more depth the complementarities, rather than the differences, between the internalization and internationalization perspectives on international expansion. Implications for research on the diamond of international competitiveness Porter (1990) has suggested that international competitiveness at the level of specific industries depends critically on a favorable configuration of home country diamond conditions. Here, four determinants have been viewed as critical: factor conditions (with a focus on created and advanced production factors) demand conditions (with a focus on total demand and sophistication of demand, based on precursor status) related and supporting industries (with a focus on the presence of world-class firms with which cluster type linkages exist) and strategy, structure and rivalry (whereby strong rivalry and benchmarking against the toughest competitors are critical to innovation). Porters perspective has led to several follow-up studies, providing extensions and suggestions to augment his path-breaking model ( Cartwright, 1993 Dunning, 1996 Moon et al. 1998 Rugman and DCruz, 1993 Rugman and Verbeke, 1993 Rugman et al. 1995 ). The data in this paper suggest two important extensions of research building upon the diamond concept. First, the diamond may be useful primarily to expand internationally in the home triad region, meaning that favorable diamond conditions in the home country may be insufficient in most cases to permit a truly global expansion. IB research should focus on the reasons for this lack of relevance of the home country diamond in host triad regions. Second, a limited geographic scope of the national diamonds significance for international competitiveness has asymmetric implications for large economies such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, and small open economies such as Canada, Belgium, and Singapore. For MNEs originating in large countries, it means reassessing the market attractiveness of the so-called small markets in the home triad region. The presence of FSAs instrumental to achieving a high market share in geographically proximate markets, but that are region bound, should refocus these MNEs efforts from assessing foreign market attractiveness through using macroeconomic data toward developing and using data that better indicate the firms real market penetration potential, as illustrated by the Tricon case discussed in Ghemawat (2001). As regards MNEs from small open economies, the data suggest that it makes sense to focus on demand in adjacent, large economies that are part of the home region. This is consistent with the double diamond thinking in IB research that focuses on MNEs in these small open economies, much in line with Moon et al. (1998). Rugman and Verbeke (1993). and Rugman et al. (1995). Here it should be emphasized that regional integration not only benefits MNEs in the form of creating supply side efficiencies, but also improves market integration on the demand side, for example in terms of positively influencing buyers confidence, attitudes and purchase intentions vis--vis products from foreign countries inside the triad region ( Agarwal et al. 2002 ). Here it would appear that, within one triad region, country of origin effects in purchasing decisions are complemented by region of origin preferences. Implications for research adopting a resource-based perspective on the integrationnational responsiveness framework Perhaps the most important implications of the empirical data on triad-based MNE activities are for research adopting a resource-based approach to MNE functioning. The integrationnational responsiveness framework, an application to the IB context of the differentiationintegration approach in organization theory ( Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 ), was developed by Prahalad (1975). and further extended by Doz (1979). Bartlett (1979). and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). The integrationnational responsiveness framework was given a TCE and resource-based interpretation by Rugman and Verbeke (1992. 2001 ). The latter authors have argued that benefits of integration, in the form of scale economies, scope economies, and benefits of exploiting national differences, require non-location-bound FSAs. In contrast, benefits of national responsiveness require location-bound FSAs. In this revised model Bartlett and Ghoshals (1989) transnational solution could be interpreted as a firm that can effectively access and deploy the required dual knowledge bundles (of NLB and LB FSAs) for each activity to be performed, for each product, within each SBU. The data presented in this paper, however, suggest the need for an extension of the framework. The conventional framework needs to be augmented, as operating in the home triad region may be associated with new needs for the development of region-bound FSAs, imposed by regional integration: see for example the nine cases discussed by Rugman and Verbeke (1991). especially the Volvo Trucks case. Hence regional integration creates both a threat and an opportunity for MNEs as they need to complement the conventional bundles of non-location-bound FSAs and location-bound FSAs with a set of region-bound FSAs. The data in this paper suggest that many of the worlds largest and most international MNEs have been quite successful in doing so. In contrast, few of these firms appear capable of developing and deploying the required set of region-bound FSAs in host regions. The few cases where MNEs have been exceptionally successful in a host region (see Table 4 ) merit further attention. Here the focus should not be on those firms that acquired a position merely because of a merger (as in the DaimlerChrysler case), but on those where FSAs have really been built over time, for example by finding ways to access or plug in to pockets of new knowledge ( Doz et al. 2001 ). Many large MNEs do have a strong geographical dispersion of their sourcing and production, both in resource industries and in manufacturing, but appear incapable (or unwilling) of capitalizing on this position to achieve global sales penetration. The observed asymmetry between sourcingmanufacturing and sales has two critical implications. First, it means that the concept of location-bound vs non-location-bound FSAs needs to be extended. The former concept usually implies that profitable deployment is possible only in the home country. The latter concept assumes global transferability. The data suggest that many MNEs have FSAs that are region bound: that is, they can be deployed across national borders, but only in a limited geographic region. Here, value added through aggregation, in the sense of exploiting similarities across countries ( Ghemawat, 2003 ), can be achieved in the home region but appears difficult across regions. Second, the required MNEs FSAs in upstream activities to achieve global sourcing (of RampD outputs, raw materials, intermediate inputs, labor and capital) and production, may be very different from the FSAs required in downstream activities to achieve a global distribution of sales. Here, value added through arbitrage ( Ghemawat, 2003 ) that is, exploiting differences between countries appears to be achievable more often across regions. In this context, Figure 1 shows two hypothetical accumulation patterns over time, of the MNEs FSAs at the upstream end (sourcingproduction) and the downstream end (sales). At either end of the value chain these resource bundles consist of non-location-bound FSAs, location (read country)-bound FSAs and region-bound FSAs. The limited market performance achieved in host triad regions suggests that most firms are not capable of accessing and deploying the required knowledge bundles at the downstream end, because these bundles are likely to be quite different from the knowledge combinations effective in the home triad region, whereas this does not necessarily hold for more upstream activities. In broader terms, national and home region organizing principles adopted by MNEs, and engrained in their FSAs, appear to limit most MNEs repertoire of downstream strategies required to be effective in the host region market. This is particularly interesting given that many markets, especially for commodity products, are characterized by global (uniform) prices, driven by global competition. In contrast, it appears much easier to adopt effective sourcing (and manufacturing) strategies associated with a broad geographical coverage. The liability of foreignness faced by the MNE ( Hymer, 1976 Zaheer, 1995 ) thus needs to be unbundled into downstream and upstream components. Old and new perspectives on the largest 500 companies. The diagonal arrow in Figure 1 shows a hypothetical expansion path over time, whereby the FSAs available for effective global sourcingproduction (here in the sense of broad geographical coverage, but not necessarily limited to a triad context, as the optimal geographical configuration of sourcing and production is firm and industry specific) and those for global market penetration grow in very similar ways. In contrast, the arrow on the left-hand side of the diagonal in Figure 1 reflects a new perspective on the typical large top-500 MNE, which is trapped in its home triad region as far as market penetration is concerned. Here the development of downstream FSAs seriously lags behind the growth in upstream FSAs. It may thus be potentially easy to achieve a global distribution of sourcingproduction, whereas a global distribution of sales may be more difficult to accomplish. To a large extent, much of the recent work on the globalization of particular value chain functions, such as finance, RampD, purchasing and logistics, and production, has focused solely on the upstream portion of the MNEs FSA bundles. This largely reflects an arbitration issue, with the MNE taking advantage of the incomplete integration of factor markets ( Ghemawat, 2003 ). This may reflect a global logic in the minds of managers, but is distinct from a strong global market performance. Implications for research on MNE structure A large body of work has been written on the need for a fit between strategy and structure in MNEs, as a precondition for survival, profitability and growth, much in line with mainstream work in strategy and industrial organization on domestic firms. In this particular case the strategic importance of each triad region, combined with the different market characteristics faced by MNEs in each of these regions, would suggest the introduction of geographic components in the MNEs structure. The data in this paper, suggesting a strong discrepancy between intra-regional and inter-regional sales, may have important implications for MNE structure. In addition, the differentiation between downstream and upstream activities, building upon different sets of FSAs, should be reflected in the MNEs organizational structure, systems and perhaps even culture. Several papers have been written on regional components in MNE organizational structure, such as regional headquarters ( Daniels, 1987 DCruz, 1986 Dunning and Norman, 1987 Grosse, 1981 Heenan, 1979 Lasserre, 1996 Morrison et al. 1991 ). Yeung et al. s (2001) analysis of such regional headquarters in Singapore argues that their roles will depend on a number of parameters, which include geographical distance, familiarity with the host region, commitment to the host region, and regional integration, thus implicitly suggesting the importance of using the regional headquarters to complement in an idiosyncratic way each MNEs existing FSA bundles. More research is needed that links the required knowledge bundles for each critical value-added activity in host triad regions with specific structural elements, which may also include elements of organizational physiology and psychology ( Yeung et al. 2001 ). Here it should be recognized that such regional elements may increase the difficulty of managing multidivisional (M-form) companies, as performance evaluation should be differentiated for units operating in the various regions, even within similar businesses, given the enormous differences in environmental circumstances faced by the affiliates in each region. In other words, even at a single point in time, MNEs may adopt both participative decentralization and administrative centralization simultaneously. These two approaches have traditionally been viewed as inefficient corruptions of the M-form ( Freeland, 1996 Williamson, 1975 ), but may in reality constitute a precondition for the effective governance of MNEs with regional strategies. Here participative decentralization reflects the involvement of regional divisions in corporate strategic planning, and this may be critical for successfully conducting downstream activities in host regions, given both the relative lack of appropriate information at the corporate headquarters level on host regions, and the need to preserve subsidiary commitment and initiative in those host regions. In contrast, administrative centralization may be more appropriate for the management of upstream activities across regions, given the relative availability of information at corporate headquarters on these activities and the possibility of reducing both production and coordination costs through optimally exploiting imperfections in national and regional factor markets. Implications for research on the performance effects of geographical diversification Much of the literature on geographical diversification has attempted to evaluate the impact of diversification on profit performance ( Buckley et al. 1977. 1984 Geringer et al. 1989 Hitt et al. 1997 Morck and Yeung, 1991 Rugman, 1976 ). Usually some proxy is adopted for the share of foreign sales in total sales (or in some cases a more upstream end related measure, such as the number of subsidiaries abroad) to assess the degree of geographical diversification. Recent research has established the importance of the home country environment that is, the locus of origin of geographic diversification efforts for the scope and financial performance effects of geographic diversification ( Wan and Hoskisson, 2003 ). In this paper, however, we emphasize the importance of the locus of destination. The relative sales in host triad regions, vis--vis the home triad region, are themselves a critical performance parameter. Perhaps the mixed results in past research on the profit impact of geographical diversification, may be partly explained by (1) a lack of investigation of the locus of destination of the diversification efforts (intra-regional vs inter-regional), and (2) the fact that market share success in non-home triad markets may be at the expense of profit performance. Thus future research on the impacts of geographic diversification should study explicitly the regional patterns and scope of MNE sales growth. In addition, it could include relative sales in host region markets as a performance parameter (dependent variable), rather than as a mere independent variable affecting financial profitability. Recent work by Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) correctly points out that some benefits of international expansion (such as tax benefits, common purchasing, and improved access to inexpensive labor) are easier to realize than other benefits, which require learning. Although these authors do not view host region market penetration performance relative to home region performance as a proxy for international success, their work does suggest that a broader geographic scope of the expansion process negatively moderates the impact of a firms foreign subsidiaries on its profitability. More specifically, they demonstrate that a broader geographic scope strains the MNEs absorptive capacity ( Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ), particularly in the short run, leading to time compression diseconomies. They also show that foreign expansion is easier to absorb for MNEs if it occurs in related countries, following the classification of countries into clusters developed by Ronen and Shenkar (1985) . Another recent paper by Ruigrok and Warner with a focus on upstream FSAs confirms this perspective. Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) suggest that US firms are usually characterized by an inverted J-curve, in terms of internationalization impact on performance (measured by return on assets). Internationalization is associated with performance improvements, until a threshold is reached, when performance starts to decline. The reason is that US firms usually expand in a first stage to culturally proximate countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. In contrast, German firms face a U-curve in terms of performance effects of internationalization. A low psychic distance is found in only two small economies, namely Austria and Switzerland, which implies that German firms are required to target a much wider and more varied market (the EU) from the outset, thereby incurring higher learning costs. Ruigrok and Wagners (2003) perspective on upstream internationalization suggests that, even there, the linkages between country of origin and country of destination are critical in determining the optimal route of internationalization and organizational learning. This is an important observation, as influential work in IB has argued that the operational flexibility of MNEs, resulting from their internationally dispersed network of affiliates, confers arbitraging advantages, information-related network externalities, etc. ( Kogut, 1983 Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994 ). However, the analysis above suggests that the locus of destination determines the extent to which such benefits can be earned. More specifically, a lower (cultural, administrative, geographic and economic) distance, although reducing the hypothetical, maximum arbitraging and network externality benefits, will facilitate earning such benefits in practice. Future research should investigate whether the prior existence of a strong internal network in the home region (and the related proven ability to learn and to manage risks) is critical for subsequent positive performance effects of inter-regional expansion. The creation of a strong competitive position in the home region may reflect one step in an evolutionary strategy of resource recombinations, which follows a clear sequential pattern and creates platforms for future investments ( Kogut and Zander, 1993 ). However, it is unclear whether such platforms are themselves truly non-location-bound, or can only be applied in a limited geographic space. Conclusions Most large MNEs have an average of 80 of total sales in their home triad region. Only nine firms among the largest 500 companies are unambiguously global. What are the normative implications of this observation It could be argued that these few examples of global corporate success should be viewed as best practices and benchmarks, to be carefully studied, and emulated by other large MNEs, most of which are characterized by a much more narrow and shallow penetration of host region markets. However, the observed weak market position in host regions, as compared with the home triad market, may also be interpreted as the outcome of a rational preference for regionally based activities, resulting from a careful costbenefit calculation. Here, strategic interactions among large players, taking the form of inter-regional chess, may influence international sales patterns and the selection of target markets. More generally, it could be argued, from a co-evolutionary perspective, that regional strategies of MNEs are embedded in and co-evolve with the broader competitive, organizational and institutional contexts at the regional level, in the spirit of Koza and Lewin (1998). In this situation, MNE regional strategy choices evolve interdependently with changes in prevailing industry practices, legitimate organizational forms, government regulations, etc. It should be recognized that regions themselves may change over time (as with the inclusion of all the Americas in NAFTA and further EU expansion), and therefore provide new opportunities for MNE growth. The triad perspective developed in this paper should therefore be viewed as a starting point for future empirical analyses, recognizing that regionalization is open-ended over time. When globalization does occur, it is restricted to the upstream end of the value chain. Some of the worlds largest MNEs master the art of connecting globally dispersed inputs. These can be in the form of financial capital, human capital, RampD knowledge, components, etc. and can be integrated to better serve home region clients. Hence it appears possible to be global at the upstream end of the value chain, and much can undoubtedly be learned from observing and imitating the routines of global leaders in this portion of the value chain. Does this imply that large MNEs should be complacent as far as the downstream end is concerned and focus solely on their home region of the triad Probably not, but senior MNE management should understand that widespread geographic diversification may well have managerial pitfalls similar to the conventional drawbacks of product diversification. A clear focus is required in terms of scope of geographic expansion, and the economic evaluation of international growth plans must take into account the costs of inter-regional distance and the liability of inter-regional foreignness. Finally, this paper has uncovered two fundamental paradoxes of IB that so far have eluded most, if not all, scholars in the field. First, at the downstream end, national responsiveness and localized adaptation are almost universally advocated as a panacea for penetrating international markets, but in reality most MNEs attempt to add value primarily by capitalizing on similarities across markets. This is an aggregation strategy often met with success in the home region. Second, at the upstream end (including FDI-driven foreign manufacturing), opportunities for scale and scope are usually considered abundant. Yet, in reality, MNEs add value primarily through arbitrage that is, exploiting differences across nations and regions. Successful integration thus reflects locational specificities, and entails a process of internalization arbitrage . it refers essentially to the combination of the MNEs upstream FSAs, deployed in host countries, with these countries location advantages. We live in a world of semi-globalization, where IB research needs to rethink fundamentally the substance of aggregation and arbitrage opportunities. A renewed focus on MNE strategies, distinguishing between home and host triad regions, and between upstream and downstream activities, may be a good starting point for such an endeavor. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Duke University JIBS and CIBER Conference on Emerging Frontiers in International Business Research, 69 March 2003. We are pleased to acknowledge the help of Arie Lewin in stimulating this article. 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